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John Lee is professor of law at the Marshall-Wythe 
School of Law, College of William and Mary, Wil-
liamsburg, Virginia . He is grateful to the college for a 
summer research grant on the profits sha.re issue. 
In this article, Professor Lee charts two alterna-
tive methods for implementing an aggregate solu-
tion to the problem of partnership profits share for 
services. The functional, or judicial, method is to 
handle (1) the exchange of partner-capacity services 
for a profit share subject to the risk f the venture 
with th e Culbertson "common law relation of 
partnership," nonrealization event doctrine, im-
plicitly contemplated by the 1984 legi Jative history 
to sec tion 707(a)(2), (2) the classic Diamolld tran-
Sitory partner with a substance-over-form rule or 
step-transaction rule, and (3) a sale of the partner-
shjp interest in circumstances that would result in 
ordinary income in a sale of a proprietorship by a 
proprietress with the P'G. Lake "substitution for or-
dinary income" doctrine, widely applied in 
analogou cases under the 1939 code. Lee believes 
that rathe r than just setting forth standards, regula-
tions should implement structured discretionary 
jus tice. Therefore, he recommends that the Service 
and the Treasury use regulations to legislate a 
defiJled "tainted freestanding intangible" approach, 
inspired in part by United States v. Stafford and in 
part by Wolfsen Land & Cattle, which would treat the 
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value created by performance of partner-capacity 
services (or the promise of future partner-capacity 
services) as a built-in gain freestanding intangible. 
The transfer of such an intangible to th partnership 
in return for a profits interest subject to the risks of 
the venture, says Lee, would fall under section 721 's 
nonrecognition umbrell a, as in Stafford. Lee explains 
that sales by the service partner of her five-yea r 
profits share wou1.d be tainted as follows. The tr,lnS-
ferred intangible would carry ordinary inc me 
status in the transferee partnership'S "hands" for 
five year under section 724, with mandatory alloca-
tions of the built-in tainted gain under section 704{c) 
to the service partner. 
Lee suggests two alternative tax accounting solu-
tions to a year two sale of a profits share. His Alterna-
tive A would be to hold the transaction (receipt of the 
profits share) open for two years under the "indeter-
minable character" variant of the open transaction 
doctrine to see whether there will be (1) no sale with 
the two-year window and resultant nonrecognition 
and sale thereafter likely a t capital gain Oust like a 
proprietress), or (2) a sale in year two resulting in 
ordinary income because of a transitory parlner. His 
Alternative B would be to apply year tv.'o balancing 
entry notions based upon a reading of Hillsboro. 
(The first part of this article appeared in Tax Notes, 
Mar. 28, 1994, at p . 1733.) 
III. The N eed for an Aggregate Approach ~" 2 
This article proposes two alternative roads to im -
plementing an aggregate so lution to th e partnership 
for services conundrum. The functi o nal approach, 
more itted to judicial resoluti on, is to hzmdle (a) the 
exchan ge of partner-capacity services for a profit shnre 
subj ec t to th e ri s k of the venture under the Clilbertsoll 
162Credi t to McKee, supra note 89. For criticism of the en-
tity /capital accounts analysis presented therein or at I ast its 
results, see Hearings on H.R. 1658, H.R 2571, H.R. 3397, and H.R. 
4488 (Issues Relating to Pass through Entities before th.e House 
Ways & Means Subcomm. on Select Revenu Measures, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1986) (Statement of Ass' t Secretary for Tax 
Policy Roger Mentz)); Widener, "Partnership Allocations and 
Capital Accounts Analy is," 42 Ohio 51. 1... J. 467,498-504 (1981). 
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"common law partner relation," (b) the classic Diamond 
tran itory partner with a substance-over-form ruJe or 
s tep-transac tion rule, and (c) a sale of the partnershjp 
interest in circumstances that would result in ordinary 
income in a sale of a proprietorship by a proprie tress 
with the "substitution for ordinary income" doctrine 
of Hart and P.C. Lake.263 In fact, the Service and the 
courts (by and large under the 1939 code) have already 
hiked along the "common-law concept of the partner-
ship relation" and the "sub titution for orrunary in-
come" trails many times, fortunately leaving blazes 
a long the way.264 My proposed definitional " tainted 
mColllmjssioller v. P.G. l.Jzke, Inc. , 356 U.s. 260 (1958); Hort v. 
Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); Rev Rul. 82-11, 1982-1 C.B. 51, 
considered GCM 38502 (Sept. 18, 1980); Rev. Rul. 76-171, 1976-1 
C.B. 18; Rev. Rul. 60-352, 1960-1960-2 C.B. 208 (application of 
doctrine as applied in 1939 code precedents to partnership in-
terests to gift of partnership interest to a charity where partner-
ship held installment obligations with built-in ordinary gain). 
For analysis of the substitution of ordinary income doctrine by 
some in the Service, see GCM 39606 (Feb. 27, 1987) (links 
doctrine wilh not "property" for section 1221 rule, collection of 
judicial authorities at pp. 28-31; excellent discussion of pre-
Arkansas Best Corn Products authorities at pp. 46-52); Priv. let. 
RHI. 7903024 (Sept. 26, 1978) (links doctrine with rule in Com 
Prod. Co. tl. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955»; GCM 36916 (Nov. 
11, 1976) (distingHishes doctrine from assignment of income 
doctrine at pp. 8-12); GCM 33793 (Apr. 11(1968) (discussion of 
cancelJation of lease origins of doctrine at pp. 4-13); Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 8744002 GHne 29, 1987) (collection of judiciaJ authorities 
at pp. 4-10). See generally EHStice, supra note 17, and Lyon & 
Eustice, id. Lane argued against breaking out ordinary com-
ponent, all ordinary when th service partner sells too soon. 
Lane, supra note 5, at 257-58, 264-65. For assignment of income 
within the partnership, see GCM 35709 (Mar. 6(1974). 
264Por common law partner relationship, see notes 13-30 
supra, and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit catalogued 
the pre-1954 code entity-aggregate sale of a partnership in-
teres t authorities out of which grew the notion that the Lnke 
substitution for ordinary income doctrine overrode the 
separate entity approach, very much like section 751 Hnder 
the 1954 and 1986 codes. Sherlock v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 
863, 865-66 (5th Cir. 1961) (portion of partnership interest 
attributable to Hndistributed ordinary income taxed as such), 
cut. denied, 369 U.S. 802 (1962) . The dissent saw this hybrid 
rule as a "sugar-coated version of the now-rejected aggregate 
theory." 294 F.2d at 867. Entity-leaning decisions drew a dis-
tinction between partnership income a lready earned but not 
distributed as in Sherlock and true unrealized receivables 
such as billed but not coll ected fees and work-in-progress. 
See, e.g., Berry v. Unit ed States, 267 F.2d 298, 301 (6th Cir. 1959) 
(distinguish d assignment of income cases); United States v. 
Donoho, 275 f,2d 489 (8th Cir. 1960). But authorities in the 
opposing camp while adopting an entity approach as to saJes 
of partnership interests in general applied Lnke's substitution 
for ordi na ry income to unrealized receivables including 
work-in-progress. Tunnell v. Unit ed States, 259 F.2d 916, 918 
(3rd Cir. 1958); accord, Ullit ed Slntes v. Snow, 223 F.2d 103, 108 
(9th Cir.) (accrued ordina ry income), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 831 
(1955); Fischer v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied , 347 U.S. 1014 (1954); Spieker v. Commissioner, 26 T.e. 
91,97-9 (1956) (unco lJected accounts receivable and work-in-
progress). I now see that Hale v. Commissioner, I.e. Memo 
1965-274, was not a sport, only the last partnership spiritual 
descendant of these 1939 code substi tution of ordinary in-
come line of authoriti es (only Hort and P.G. Lake were ci ted 
by the Tax Court in this context.). 
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frees tanding intang ible" approach, m o re suited to 
legislative reguJations, would trea t the value crea ted 
by s uch services (or the prom ise of fu ture pa rtn ' r-
capacity services) as a built-in gain intangible. This 
idea was inspired in part by Ullil ed tates v. Stafford 265 
and in part by Wolfsen Lalld and Callie v. CO llllllis-
sioner.266 Thus, as in Stafford, a transfer of s uch a n in-
tangible to the partnership.in re turn fo r a p ro fits inter-
est subject to the risks of the venture would com e und r 
sect ion 721'5 nonrecogn ition umbre lla . 
How s hould aJ s by the n w-happy erv ice partner 
of her profits sh are be handled ? Simpl . "Taint" the 
transferred intangible with ordinary income status in 
the transferee partnershlp's "hands" for five years 
under section 724 with the premises that (1) a 
"hypothetical" sale of such value with a zero basis267 
by the service provider at the time of "contribution" 
would have yielded ordinary income since the value 
arose from the service provider's effor ts and not 
market forces, and (2) such potential ordinary income 
must be "specially" allocated under pos t-1984 section 
704(c) to the service provider upon any partnership sale 
of the property benefitted by the services (as ordinary 
income for at least five years after creation of th valu 
under section 724(c)268). What if, as is mor likely, th 
contributing partner sells her profits share (along with 
her capital account credited with the tainted intan-
gible) within five years? Such a sa le would yield ordi-
nary income to the ex tent of the value of the freestand-
ing intangible at the time of contribution due to the 
interplay of section 704(c}, 724, and 751(a).269 This 
" tainted built-in-gain intangible" s olution works 
easiest with past services rendered by a partner to be 
(where the potential for conversion of ordinary income 
into capital gains probably is the greatest). But the 
same approach can be applied to past services rendered 
265727 F.2d 1043 (11th Cir. 1984). 1 r cognize that Stafford 
itself is subject to a form-over-substance charge. 1991 L.A. Bar 
Report, supra note 5; 1991 New York City Bar Report, supra 
note 45. But so is any distinction between partner-capacity 
services rendered before or after formation of the partnership. 
1991 L.A. Bar Report, slIpra; GCM 37193 Guly 13, 1977); 1991 
Chicago Bar Report, supra note 1. Such assHmption HOderlies 
the 1984 legislative history as wel\, notes 230-34 supra and 
accompanying text; and Rev. Proc. 93-27, therefore, correctly 
follows through. Use of the tainted built-in-gain contributed 
intangible is in the end a legal fiction chosen to effect equity 
in an Hnanticipated year 2 disposition. 
26672 T.e. I, 13 (1979). 
261This assmnes that the service provider deducted the 
cos ts of crea ting the freestanding intangible in the year 
created ; however, capital expenditure or start- up cost treat-
ment may be more appropriate in some cases. 
268 After five years if entrepreneur sold, capital gains usual-
ly would result an yway under a primary purpose tes t. Cf 
Tollis v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 1993-63. 
269Section 751(a) provides that any money or property 
received by a transferor partner for all or a part of his interest 
in partnership section 751(c) or 751 (d) items is considered as 
ordinary income, overriding the entity/capital asset rule of 
section 741. Due to sections 704(c) and 724, the entire tainted 
intangible would go into the transferor partn r's interest in 
partnership "inventory items" deemed so disposed of. 
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to the partnership prior to formally becoming a partner 
and to future services rendered after becoming a 
partner, with a couple of additional steps. First, treat 
the service renderer's promise to render services 
without compensation other than the profit share as 
itseli a "tainted" zero-basis intangible in the hands of 
the partnership specially allocated to the service 
renderer/partner. Performance of the "promised" ser-
vices by the partner converts, in a nonrealiza lion even t, 
the partnership'S promise/intangible into the intan-
gible created by the performance of such services, 
which continues to be held by the partnership with an 
exchange basis and taint. The tainted intangible ap-
proach is consistent with, and arguably even mandated 
by, an aggregate approach because character of gain 
turns on the partner's activities. 
A. Pre-Formation Services 
Under the emerging approach of section 707(a)(2), 
the question is twofold: Were the services of the sort 
that would be performed by a partner within her 
capacity as a partner? If so, was the form of payment 
a "distributive share" or a more risk-free payment? 
Under this analysis, in most cases, the service provider 
would be a partner performing services within the 
scope of partner activity and the "payment" would 
constitute a section 702 distributive share, followed by 
distribution.27o As further discussed below, from an 
aggregate policy perspective as well, when the service 
provider "materially participates," the partnership 
should be treated as an aggregate to yield as close an 
approximation to "direct taxation as a proprietress" as 
possible. 
1. Stafford: Freestanding intangible created by 
pre-formation services. The leading decision con-
sidering "past services" embodied in intangible 
property transferred to a ~artnership for a profits share 
is Stafford v. United States. n There, the services partner, 
in addition to obtaining favorable financing (all that 
the services partner had provided in Diamond), ob-
tained a ground lease from the lender who owned the 
property on which a ~tel was to be built adjacent to 
its offices, raised equity~apital from limited partners, 
270See note 43 supra and accompanying text. 
'Z'Jt727 F.2d 1045 (11th Cir. 1984). GCM 37193 auly 13,1977) 
seemingly approved of an analysis with the retroactive al-
location to a service partner close to that advocated in text. 
ld. 
In the proposed revenue ruling A performed dis-
covery, promotion, and preliminary contact work prior 
to the formation of the partnership. However, he trans-
ferred to the partnership all the rights and benefits 
attributable to that work. The fact that he performed 
the services prior to formation of the partnership might 
conceivably raise a question whether his transfer to the 
partnership consisted of property rather than services. 
As discussed above, however, this question should not 
be relevant in determining the application of Code sec-
tion 707(a). What is relevant for purposes of that sec-
tion is whether the transfer is in substance a 
contribution to the partnership. 
TAX NOTES, April 4, 1994 
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formed a limited partnership, and served as general 
partner. The Eleventh Circuit held in Stafford that the 
value created by the promoter, here a letter of intent to 
provide financing, constituted property and hence 
came within section 721.272 Thus, Stafford seemingly 
undercuts the Diamond principle that a profits interest 
received for services constitutes a taxable transaction 
(when the profits interest can be valued) by creating 
an exception for past services.273 
Stafford seemingly undercuts the 
Diamond principle that a profits 
interest received for services 
constitutes a taxable transaction by 
creating an exception for past 
services. 
Mnrk TV Pictures, Inc . v. Commissioner2'4 narrowly 
compartmentalized a transfer of services and related 
property created by such or similar services (for a capi-
tal interest) into a transfer of property encompassed by 
section 721 and a taxable transfer of services for an 
interest. Judge Gibson, the author of the opinion, had 
participated in the three-judge panel that had decided 
Campbell in the Eighth Circuit the prior year, but did 
not write the opinion there. The opinion in Mark IV 
reads Campbell most narrowly: 
Under 26 U.S.C. section 721, no income is 
recognized when a taxpayer exchanges proper-
ty for a partnership interest. However, when a 
taxpayer exchanges services for a partnership 
interest, he must include the fair market value 
of that interest in gross income under 26 U.S.C. 
section 61(a) (1988). See CampbeIl v. Commis-
sioner, 943 F.2d 815, 821 -23 (8th Cir. 1991). 
Similarly, when a taxpayer contributes both 
property and services to a partnership in ex-
change for a partnership interest, the taxpayer 
is entitled to exclude from gross income only 
that portion of the interest which was ex-
changed for property. United States v. Stafford, 
727 F.2d 1043, 1055 (11th Cir. 1984).275 
This narrow (and I believe incorrect) reading of 
Campbell highlights the perils of case law resolution of 
this area: conflicting decisions and attendant uncer-
tainty. We need either a landmark decision clearly ar-
ticulating policies and theories for the area or 
administrative rules doing the same or, for the present, 
drawing more lines than Revenue Procedure 93-27, 
which is a very good first step. 
An underlying policy in the context of a profits share 
received for services is prevention of a service renderer 
mContrast Mark IV, 969 F.2d at 673: (failure to show 
"guaranteed payments" covered value of services; the.refore, 
transfer of intangible for interest also may have covered in 
part services.) 
27JSee note 265 supra. 
214969 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1992). 
27SMark TV, 969 F.2d at 672. 
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from converting service-cre ted value into capital 
gainP' Stafford, unlike Diamond, would appear to be 
contrary to this pOlicy,271 in that the profits share 
r ceiv d tax-free could be sold after the requisite hold-
ing period rguably resulting in capital gains. Actually, 
the more likely judicial result would be ordinary in-
com under the "substitution of ordinary" income 
doctrine. This doctrine is closeLy related to substance 
over fonn, assignment of income, and hence the ag-
gregate approach, as the Service and very late 1939 
code cases involving sales of partnership interests, 
litigated, how ver, after enactment of the 1954 code 
(and section 751) recognized.278 This same underlying 
avoidance of distortion of income policy was at work 
in Hale v. Commissioner,279 a pre-Diamond services case, 
wh re the Tax Court deni.ed capital gains to the sale of 
a profits interest on the grounds that it was merely a 
future income carve-out, pursuant to P.G. Lake, Inc. v. 
Commissioner.Ulo Many practitioner commentators have 
called for orcUnary income lock-in when a services 
partner ree ives a profits interest as a concomitant to 
norueeognltion.U1 A more narrow approach is to treat 
the transitory ownership of a oroflts interest as indicat-
276 n, suprn note 8, at 252-58. 
2771991 L.A. 13 r Report, supra note 5 ("W also note that a 
rule providing for the taxability of th capital interest partner 
invites voidance by partners who will contribute self-con-
struct d prop rty, often of dubious real economic value, to a 
partn hlp In exchange for a partn rship interest. Por ex-
ampl, in re I tate partnerships, develop rs frequently con-
tribute overY lued business plans, dr wings, plans and 
specifications, and loan commitments."); Stt also 1991 New 
York City B r Report, supra note 45 ("Does this [Stafford) 
me n th t Mr. Diamond would have been better advised to 
agree with hi prospective partner that he would be entitled 
to a partnership interest If he were 10 obtain a letter of intent 
and contribute it to the partnershlp? It ppears that this may 
well b th c , but such a sup rficial distinction does not 
seem to warrant such a significanUy different tax result."). 
%1ISee notes 263 and 264 supra. 
17924 T.C.M. 1497 (1965). TuJtnell v. United Stntes, 259 F.2d 
916,918 (3rd Cit. 1958), also applied P.G. Lake under the 1939 
code to treat the part of the gain from the sale of a partnership 
interest attributable to accounts receiv ble. 
2M3S6 US. 260 (1958). Ste gtnera/ly Lyon &: Eustice, supra 
note 11. 
m"SecUon 121 should be amended to provide that, where 
a partnership interest is received principally for services and 
tax tion is def ned, a partner's distributive share and his 
gain from Ie of his partnership interest should be recharac-
teriz d as ordinary ~come in all ev nts. Section 741 should 
be mend d accord ingly." 1991 LA. Bar Report, supra note 
5. Othe.r b ck.-up amendments were sugg steel. 
Section 721 should be amended to provide a special 
anti-abuse rule to tax a service partner on the receipt 
of cash or other property in exc s of his net cumula-
tive distributive share of partnership in orne. A partner 
then should be nontaxable on his subsequent distribu-
tive share of partnership income to the extent that in-
come h s been acceleraled under the immediately 
previous sen tence. Conforming amendments should be 
made to Section 733 to provide that partner's tax 
(Footnote 281 continued in next column.) 
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ing that the services were not rendered by the service 
partner in her capacity as a partner.Ul 
2. Tainted specially allocated built-in gain intan-
gible. Aserviees-created-intangibl approach to profit 
shares for services (Stafford) standing by itself under-
cuts both Diamond and, ultim t ly, Rev. Proc. 93-27 in 
most cases. The Deficit R duction Act of 1984 amend-
ments to the partnership provision (coupled with sec-
tion 707(a)(2» inspire a technical approach that recon-
ciles Stafford with the underlying policy of prevention 
of conversion of income, while a t the same time provid-
ing a mechanism for taxation of the service partner at 
the more appropriate time, namely disposition of the 
partnership profits interest or a disposition by the 
partnership of the underlying vatu created by the sec-
vic s rartner. Under section 724, nacted by the 1984 
act, i property transferred by the services partner 
would have yielded ordinary Income if sold by her at 
the time of contribution, such value constitutes an "in-
ventory" item as to the tran feror partner,2lI3 and henc 
an inventory item to the transfer e partnership for the 
five-year period following its contribution. Conse-
quently, a partnership sale of this vaJue (within five 
years), as part of a sale of the project or property 
benefitted by the services rendered, will result in ordi-
nary gain. Such built-in gain must be specially alia-
e ted to the transferor partner und r seetion 704(c), due 
to the differ nce between its basis in the hands of the 
transferor partner carried over in ction 723 to the 
partnership and its value at the time of the contribu-
tion. Section 724 taints such "lov otory items" as to the 
partner hip and partner for only five years. Similarly, 
if during this initial five-year period, the service 
partner sold her partnership profits interest, section 
724 coupled with section 751(a) would equally result 
in ordinary income to the service partner. For this con-
ceptual framework to work, the value created by the 
service partner should not b added to the basis of, say, 
a partnership section 1231 asset, but treated instead as 
a fr e-standing asset equivalent to a ftnancial account-
ing deferred charge, yielding ordinary income upon 
sale.284 
ba is in his partner hip interest should not be 
decreased by the recharacterized distribution of ca h, 
and it similarly should not be increased by the 
recharacterized subsequent di tributlve share of 
partnership income. 
ld. The New York City 13 r, in ontrast, saw uno abu e In 
allowing a e.rvice partner to achieve capital gain in a risk 
venture. This is particularly true in th context of a partner-
ship because partners are not required under the normal 
parto rship tax rules to allocate risk g in proportiona tely to 
capltaJ." 1991 New York City Bar Report, supra note 45. 
1111981 ABA Tax Section Report, slIpra note 31. 
ltJSectlon 124(c)(I) cro refer to th d finition of inven-
tory item in section 751(d)(2), which includes any property 
who e ale would in effect generate ordinary income, literal-
ly "property other than an capital asset and other than 
property described in section 1231." 
U4Cf. Lee, "Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and Oear Reflec-
tion of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, 
and Touch of Basics," 6 Va. Tax Rev. 1,32-38 (1986). 
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As to the critical premise that a h ypoth tical sale by 
a propri tress of such self-crea ted value instead of con-
trib uti on would have yi Ided ordinary income, the 
cases unfortunately split. Some jurisdictions allow ex-
tensive effort by the taxpayer to still yield capitaJ gain 
where only a sing l sa le is involved, a in Com missioner 
v. WiJliam s,285 wh r the taxpaye r acquired an uncom -
p le ted vesse l, but prior to construction contracted to 
e ll it after cons truction had been completed. The Fifth 
Circuit agreed that the vess I was acquired for sale and 
that it was held for ale at the time it was sold. But, 
citing Thomas v. Commissioner,286 the court pointed out 
that such purpose did not necessarily mean that the 
prop rty was sold while being held for the sale in the 
ordinary course of trad e o r business. "The purchase 
and ale of th vessel was a non-recurring speculative 
venture and the transactions of its acquisition and di -
position did not cons titute a trade or business of either 
Williams or the partnership"287 in which he was a 
partner and to which the boat was transferred for ul -
timate sa le by the partnership. The Fifth Circuit has 
r ad WiJliams as turning on no int ntion to devo te on 's 
se lf in the fu ture to the activ ity.288 
I The narrow reading of Campbell in Mark IV highlights the perils of case law resolution of this area: conflicting decisions and attendant uncertainty. 
O ther cas s have held that property acquired for the 
purpos of sa le to a specifi c party pursuant to a 
preexisting arrangement cons titutes property held for 
sale in the ordinary course of a trade or business.289 
The recen t, co ntrovers ial Third Circuit opinion in 
Pleasan t Sllmmit Land indicates that where property is 
purchased subjec t to a preexisting contract of sale, its 
sub -eq uent sa le pur uant to such contract is not neces-
285256 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1958). 
286254 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 1958). 
28 7256 F.2d 11 t 155. 
288Reese v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(Taxpayer, a corporate execu tive, financed and served as gen-
era l contractor for construction of plant, which was to be sold 
to such corporation upon completion . Taxpayer had never 
before ca rried o ut uch activities and after getting in trouble 
with the first project and having to sell it to a developer to 
compl te undoubtedly never again would be so involved . 
" [A] single transaction ordinarily will not constitute a trade 
or busin s when th taxpayer enters into the transaction 
with no expectation of continuing in the field of end eavor." ). 
189See Nie/se /l v. United St(lles, 333 F.2d 615 (6th Ci r. 1964) 
(acquisi tion of stock by brokerage house pursuant to a writ-
ten purchase order by a third party specif icall y negated any 
possible intent on the behalf of brokerage house to purchase 
st ck as its own api\al asset); DeM(lrs v. Unit ed Stll fes, 71-1 
U.S.T. . Pa ra. 9288, 27 A.F.T.R.2d 71-925 (S.D. Ind . 1968) 
(taxpayer 's sole purpose in erecting a warehouse was to sell 
it pursuant to a contract already made; held any profit real-
iz d on the contract is comp nsatory and , hence, ordinary 
income). 
TAX NOTES, April 4, 1994 
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sarily "in the ordinary course of business."29o O ther 
transactions look more to the overalJ business of the 
ta xpayer and the effort involved importing a more or 
less product -of-efforts approach. For purposes of this 
article, Bush v. Commissioner291 is mos t appos ite. 1n 
Buslt , d evelopment activities alone,292 by a taxpay r 
who previously had only rented o ut single- and multi-
family housing,293 gave rise to ordinary income upon 
the taxpayer's sale to the developer who actually con-
structed a high-rise apa rtment for sa l to the tenant 
The Tax Court in Bush saw its rol e as determining 
whether the gain was attributable to (a) bus iness ac-
tivity by the taxpayer, or (b) investment appreciation 
and market fluctuations occurring irrespective of any 
conduct by the taxpayer. The Tax Cour t co ncluded tha t 
the taxpayer 's activities in the development of the 
project were sufficien t in themselves to constitute car-
rying on a business and the taxpayer 's efforts were not 
merely improvements in an a ttempt to di pose of hold-
ings advantageously in aJ1 orderly business-like man-
ner. "When considered in light of all the facto rs, the 
substantiality and value of petitioners' development 
activities in re lation to the origi nal cos t of the inte res ts 
involved and their individua l fa ir ma rket values is 
convincing evidence .... The gain did not res ult from 
appreciation over a long period of time, nor may the 
gain be attributed to short-term market fluctua tions. 
Rather, the gain is solely attributab le to development 
activities of petitioners, their agents and their as-
socia tes."294 Finally, look at what the taxpayer so ld : 
Two parcels of land, options to purchase adjoining 
property, a letter of intent from the University of Ten-
nessee to pUIchase the property a fter a hjgh-rise apart-
ment had been built thereon and on adjoin ingJ;roperty, 
architectural p la ns, and building permits. 95 Ap art 
from the parcels of land actually owned by the tax-
paye r, these intangibles are th e paradigm for the 
tain ted frees tanding intangi ble asset model. 
290863 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied. 
29136 T.C.M. 340 (1977), afrd, 61 0 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1979). 
292These activities giving rise to trade or businesses s tatus 
consisted of "ob taining a le tter of intent from the University 
of Tennessee to purchase the property afl'er a hi gh-dse apart-
ment had been built the reon and on adjoining property, ob-
taining options to purchase the adjo ining property, p urchase 
of a parce l of adjoining prop erty, emp loyment of a rchj tects, 
obta ining building permits, consuJtati ons and negotiations 
with the par ty that ultim ately purchased the entire package 
that included these parcels, who in tUIn was to build the 
apartment and sell it to the University, and activi ties f tax-
payers in aid of thei r purchaser in closing the transaction 
with the University of Tennessee." 610 F.2d at 427-28. 
291The taxpayer acq uired several parcels of adjacent real 
property as rental property and then ap proached the Univer-
s ity of Tennessee with a proposal to construct a 320-unit 
apartment house for lease to the university. in the course of 
negotiations prior to the commencement of cons truction, it 
became clear that the university would purchase the property 
rather than lease it. 
29'36 T.C.M. at 350. 
295Jhe taxpayer a lso was compensated by the pur-
chaser I developer for negotiation with th univer ity to 
bring it into the deaJ . 
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A prime adva ntage f this model is that it req u ires 
no impl mentin g I g is la tion . Profit hare for service 
lies in th ar of th taff 1984 nd 1 6-87 "restate-
ments" of partn [ship ta ation prepared by the JCT 
staff, and thus, ther i unlikely t be any push for 
Congr t r vi it the ar a . ommentators now need 
to do their j b, if Ihe er ice is to go to the next step. 
B. Service 
Th EI 
for an E i t ing Part nership 
ntb ircuil in lafford was careful to point 
ownership rights in th let ter of intent to 
f r n tru ti n at favorable terms 
p. rtn r and not with the partner-
The Service, al I a I at ne lim , may have been recep-
ti e to this di ti nction, observing that a ta payer's per-
formanc of" rvi c pri r to formation of the 
par tnersh ip mi ht c nc i abl rai e a ques ti on 
wheth r hi tTnns f r t th partner hip c nsisted of 
property rather than ervices."29? 
Slafford r Ii dna ti n 351 deci i n , James v. 
Commis iOller,29H wher a ta payer providing serv ices 
entered in to c nlr c l ~ ilh th capita l providers 
whereby th s rvic pr vider reed 10 secure neces-
ary lega l and architectural work and arrange for a 
financing of a rental apartm nl pr j c t n th capita l 
s uppli ' r ' la nd . Upon mp l ti n of Lhe projec t, the 
landown rs would trans f r th ir land to a corporation, 
whi ch wou ld Ih · n iss ue s toc k bo th to th la ndowner 
and to Ih e rvi provid r. T he s tock issued to the 
se rvic provid e r w as purp rted ly received in ex-
change f r a I an o mmitm nl f r th e financing of 
the proj ec t. T he loan co mmitm ent ran in favor of the 
corporali n be au > th e I nd e rs' regula t ions p e r-
mitt d comm ilm nts on l t rporalion and not to 
individual . In th c rp r t ntext, sec tion 351(d) 
and pr d c s or provi i n cI a rl y s ta te that "ser-
vices" d n I c n litlll prop rly f r purposes of 
sec ti o n 351, whi hal r uire iI prope rty tra nsfe r. 
How e er, th exp li ci t s tatutory xclu ion of "ser-
vice" fr m th t rm "pr p rt " under th 1954 and 
19 6 c d es ilppar nll y a hi v d th ame result as 
""727 E2d atl 049. 
1975ce G M 37'193 Ouly 13, I 77), p. ,see also pp 21-2; cf 
Tech. Adv. M m . 8047005 Uuly 24, 198D) (p oling of capital 
doctrine may apply to se rvices perform d prior to the reser-
voir of c:lp it ;:ti co ming int o bing) . 
19853 T. . 69 (1969). 
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pre- 1954 case la~ .l99 And the Tax Curt, in Diamolld, 
pointed to the pr -1954 c de h i to ry of the predecess r 
t c n n 351, wher ca e law with ut any specific 
sta tut ryauthorit had e tabli h d that "services" did 
not consti tut "pro erly" for purp of the predece -
o r of ti o n 51.3 
In the corporate context section 
351(d) and predecessor provisions 
clearly state that "services II do not 
constitute properly for purposes of 
section 351, which also requires a 
property transfer. 
Under a policy analysis and a close rC<lding of the 
leg is lntive hi tory o f b th provision, the s imil a rity 
between sec ti ns 721 a nd 5 '1 in this on text di sc p-
pear .30 1 The tax p li cy r a on (or no t classifying ser-
vices as property for cction 351 purposes i - that, other-
w i ,th c rvi pr vider c n conv rt hi erv ic s int 
a s to k inl r I in the corpomtion, which Ihen co uld 
b sold a l capita l gains rates, due to the entity approach 
to sa l s o f stock int re ts in C o r S corporation .302 The 
c lIap ibJ rp ration pr v i ions only infrequ nll y 
r tard this c nv r 'io n f the service into capitnl 
gains. 3OJ O n the oth r hand , a di scu sed above, sec-
b n 704( ),724, and 7 1 pr duc th proper character 
and Liming: ordinary inc m t the s n ' ice parLner, but 
nly upon a di position by the partn rship of the altte 
crea ted by him or upon n di p ition of the p artner hip 
inlere t (during Ih fi ve-y ar laint period of e lion 
724). Th r f r , nap licy basis, pa I services for the 
partnership generally should be treated the sa me as 
past service o n Ih rvice provider's ow n behalf 
ITan ferred to the parh1 r hip . 
The model of treating Ih valu cr ated by the ser-
vice provide r as a fr s tandin intangible, i.e. , proper-
ty, exchanged for a profit har requires modificati n 
(1) whe re fu tu re s rvi c s are to b provided, and (2) 
perhap where th pJrtne r hip a lready owned the 
development rights as to which the serv ice provider 
r nders further s rvic . [n the fir ' l cas, modification 
is nece sa ry b a u e the value or inta ngib le to be 
created by the futur . rvi is not yet in existence 
when the servi es provid r rece ives hi profit share. 
The olution i ' t tr>a t th servic partner a ontrib-
2901ames, 53 T. . at 67, Ci ting an early edition of Bittl<er & 
Eustic . 
30056 T.e. at 545 n.14 . 
10I See note 152-88 supra and accompanying lexi. The Ser' 
vice in a le tt er ruling, how v r, ha s stated that in Ih conte I 
of a transfer of a le:l ehold inte r t for .. parlnersh ip interest 
that th e nonre ognilion Ir :llment afford d by sections 351 
and 721 is similar, " [allth ugh Ih r as ns originally ad-
vanc d for nom cognit ion may have been different." Priv. 
LeI. Rul. 8225069 (Mar. 24, 19 2) . 
lO2Lane, _lIpra n te 8. 
10 Thre -year wait und r s ti on 341 (d). Lee & Bader, supra 
nole 17, at 177 n . 262 . 
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uting to the partnership upon entry his promise to 
p rform future services on behalf of the partnership 
fo r no comp nsa tion beyond allocations and distribu-
tions as to the profits share304 received in exchange for 
the promise. This promise is itselJ treated as a free-
s tanding intangible. Such intangible a lso would ha ve 
a "carfyov r" zero basis unde r ection 723 in the hands 
of the partnership. Even more surely than in the case 
of the Stafford-lik intangible created by se rvices, the 
bui lt-in ga in in the promi e (the difference be tween the 
fair m rke t vaJue of the se rvice less the zero basis) at 
the time of contribution will constitute a tainted "in-
vent ry" item30S as t the contributing partner. Any 
built-in gain in s uch promise306 would b e specially al-
locable under s ction 704(c) to the service partner and 
tainted as to him for fiv years under section 724. Such 
an intangible i s imila r to the section 707 regu lation's 
deemed promise by the p a rtne rship in a disguis d sa le 
to distribute to the contributing partner cash or proper-
ty contributed by ano ther property. In most cases, the 
"promised " serv ices will have bee n rendered prior to 
any sa l by the service provider of the profits share or 
the a le by the p a rtn ership of the property to be 
ben fitted. By analogy to the "conversion of rights" 
a uthoriti e , the s rvice partner's later p e rformance of 
hi promis by rendition o f the services should not 
con titute a rea liza tion event.307 And by ana logy to, or 
1<l4Gev urtz, Business Planlling, 172 (F Ollndation Press 
1991)(ci ting Levy v. Leavitt, 257 N.Y. 461,178 N.E. 758 (193J)) . 
JOS H proprietress sold her promise to render serv ices, clear-
ly the sa le wou ld constitute substitution for ordinaxy income 
und r the P.G. Lake doctrine. 
J06'fhe partner to be u ually has little or no basis and the 
fair ma rket va lue of the promise is the discounted present 
va lu of ervi ces to be rendered for no charge. Uuilt-in-gain 
thus is present. 
307Cf. Rev. Rul. 90-7, 1990-1 CB. 153 (exchange of certifi -
cates in an inves tment trust for proportionate share of stock 
owned by such trust does not result in realization of gain or 
loss because holder is in essentially the same position as 
b ,fore); Rev. Rul. 72-265, 1972-1 C B. 222 ("The conclusion 
that no ga in o r I S5 is rea li zed upon the conversion of a 
corporat debenture in to s tock of the ob ligor corporation was 
ini tiall y stated in Article 1563 of th Treasury Regulat ions 45 
(1920 dilion) under the Revenue Act of 1918. This rule 
remains applicab le except wher prov isions of the Code 
specifica ll y require that gain be recognized." ); Rev. Rul. 72-
348,1972-2 C 6. 97 (conversions of c nvertibl e bonds to s tock 
is pu.rely a readjustmen t of the obligor's capital structure that 
does not r ult in ei ther a deductible loss or a taxable gain); 
Rev. Rul. 57-535, 1957-2 CB. 5]3 (conversion pursuant to its 
terms of nonmarketable Trea ury note into marketable 
Tr asury note does not result in realization; "a transforma-
tion of the bonds pursuant to a right contained therein rather 
than a di position thereof occurs and, accordingly, there is 
then, for federal incorn ta x purposes, no rea l exchange or 
oth r los d transa tion resu lting in a rea li za tion of gain or 
los. The notes in his hands take his gain or loss basis of the 
bonds, for determining gain or loss upon subsequ nt sale of 
other disposition of the notes. In substance and effect, he 
continued to own the same property, it form being changed 
pursuant Lo a right emb died in it when he acquired it. CO nl-
(Footnote 307 continued in next column.) 
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under, section 724(d)(3), the intangibl created by the 
services also should b e tainted. 
The Fifth Circuit in Stafford distinguished a service 
partner 's developmental ac tiviti es re u l ting in a 
mortgage commi tmen t from a s ituation where the 
partnership already owned the development righ ts. 
· owever, the tainted frees tanding intangibl model 
can be appl ied here a s well. The services performed 
should be treated as crea ting a freestanding intangible 
apart from the developmenta l rights much like in 
Waffsen Land alld Cattle, where the Tax Curt treated 
the costs of draglining irrigation ditche every 10 years 
a creating a frees tanding amortizable apart from the 
irrigation ditches them selves. 
C. Clear Reflection of Income 
Ideall y, I wou ld prefer to trea t admiss ion o f a ser-
vices pa.rtner as a common-law entry into the partner-
ship outside section 721. Then, I would d e termine if 
the partnership itself hold s the proj ct primar ily for 
sale determined at the partnership level, looking of 
course at the partner-capac ity services of a ll th e 
partners. 30B Less cleanly, "subs titution for ordinary in-
come" a la Hale could be used . The major problem with 
such a standards approach is that th COUIts mostly 
likely would conflict for some time, even in the same 
circuit. Compa.r Campbe/lll w ith Mark IV. Such a ta n-
dards approach is more su ited to courts than to an 
adminis trative agency, unless the s tandards are imple-
mented through ma ny, m a ny rules. I think, therefore, 
a better adminjs tra tive solution would follow the lines 
of the specially allocated tainted frees tanding intan-
gible approach . 
pare GCM 18436, C B. 1.937-1, 101, which applied the rule that, 
wher an owner of a bond exercises th righ t provided in the 
bond of having the bond converted into stock of the obli gor 
corporation, such transaction does not result in reaUzation of 
profi t or loss, the transaction not being closed for purposes 
of income taxation until disposit ion of the s tock_"); Rev. Rul. 
72-319, 1972-1 CB. 224 (exchange of voting trust certificate 
for underlying common s tock constituted transfer of all 
rights except voting in exchange for a II rights including 
votin g free of the trust qua lifi ed unde r section 1036 a an 
exchange of common s tock for common s tock und er an 
econom ic substance approach). See Liquid CarbOl1ic Corp. v. 
Com 111 ' r, 34 B.T.A. 11 9] (1936). Sti ll another ana l gy is 
modifica tions of contract ri ghts. In Silvers teill v. Ull/t ed States, 
419 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. J969), the appell ate court h ld 
tha t in economic substan ce an exchange of a right to receive 
fix ed annual payment for life from a trus t for a right to 
receive the sale amount on the sa me terms pajd ins tead by a 
museum did nol constitute a "d isposition" under section 
1001. A similar economic substance anal ysis was used by 
Commi5 ioner v. Olmstead Illc. Life Agency, 304 F.2d 16, 21-22 
(8th Cir. 1962), to hold that cancella ti on of a contTilct to 
receive comrrUssions in consideration of receiving a specified 
monthly annuit y running 15 years did not constitute a sale 
or other disposition und r section 1001. "[T]he n w contract 
merely provided for a different rate or manner o f payment· 
whereby the insurance company could discharge its liabili ty 
under the agency contract." Olmstead, at 22. 
JOB Lee, "Pre-Operating Expenses and Section 174: WilJ Snow 
Fall?" 27 Tax Law. 381 (1974); accord, Fellows, "Partnership, 
Taxation: Confusion in Section 702," 32 Tax L. Rev. 67 (1976). 
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D. Nonpartner Capacity Transactions 
1. 'Rendition of services in nonpartner capacity. 
Prior to the 1984 am endments to section 707(a), the 
focu s was on wh e the r the rendition of services (or 
tra n fe rs o f property o r cap ital) wa in a partne r 
ca pacity. The Tax Court, in Pratt v. COlllmiss iol1er,309 he ld 
that g neral partners receiving fees equ a l to 5 percent 
of partnership gro s receip ts fo r performing ongoing 
managerial serv ices f r the partnership were receiv ing 
neither sec tion 707(a) pay ment (because th e m anage-
ment fees w r received for se rv ices performed within 
the n rma l sc pe of the partners' duties a nd pursuant 
to the partnership agreement3 lO) nor ection 707(c) pay-
ments to a partner (since the fees were computed as 
percentag o f g ros income and he nce mea ured by 
partnership " inc m "and section 707(c) payments a re 
determined with ut rega rd to partnership incom e). 
Since the payments came under n either section 707(a) 
no r 707(c), the Ta Court held th a t sec ti ons 704 and 
702(b) app lied to th a ll oca tion and ec tion 731 applied 
to th e accompanying d is tribution. The Fifth Circuit af-
firm d the Tax Court a tits tr a lment o f the ma nage-
ment f , i . . , trea tm ent as a n a ll oca ti on and dis tribu -
tion, but solely on the "partner ca pacity" ground as to 
th ction 707(a) issue, becau e th secti on 707(c) ho ld-
ing was no t appea l d . T he Fifth C ircuit, in Pratt, 
f cu ed o n the "s op f the partners h ip" : 
[t is perfectly cI ar that the con tract creat ing 
the partnership, which provided for the percent-
age paym nts to the gen ra l partner for thei r 
management efforts w a mad e with them qua 
partners. Fur thermore, it is equa lly clea r that the 
d uties to be performed were ac tiv itie fo r w hi ch 
the partnership wns created in the fi rst place, i.e., 
th management of th s hopping c nters. Bearing 
in mind, th at the genera l s ta tutory policy fo r 
treating partn rships for ta x purposes can-
t mpl a t d tha t the incom f a partnership wo uld 
fl ow through to the individual partne rs, it is not 
d ifficult to envision the purpose of Congress 
w hen it crea ted an exception to this genera l rule 
to limit the exc pted activities to those specifical-
ly outlin d . In doing so, Congress dete rmined 
that in order for th partnership to deal with one 
30964 T.C 20 (1975), afl'd, 550 F.2d 1023 (6 th ir. 1977); see 
gwernlly Widener, supra n I 262. 
J llYfh Servic disagr s tha t gr 5S inco me a ll cations can 
(easil y) meet the section 707(c) standard of "dete rmined 
without· regard to th e in me f the partnershi p." Rev. Rul. 
1-300,1981-2 .B. 143, 144, cons idered in GeM 38607 (Aug. 
29, ] 979) (s tatut e refers to ne t inco me; watered down in 
public ruling). Its posil"ion on partner-capacity serv ices ap-
pears less I ar. See Rev. Ru1. 8]-301, 198]-2 C U. 144, 145 
(investment adviser perf rmed s imilar ervices for outsid ers 
for a fee and could be r moved by limiteds with 60 days 
notice, pays own expenses and is not liable to other partners 
for los es); GeM 37193 Ouly 13, 1977) (turns on whether 
serv ices "contributed" to partnership under c1a s ic debt-
equity nIl es; not required t be recurring), pp. 8-9; Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 864200 Oun 0, 1986), p . 21. 
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of its partners as a n "outsid er" the transac ti on 
dealt with mus t be so mething outs ide th e scope 
of the partnership If, on the other hand, the ac-
ti vit ies constituting the "transaction" were ac-
tiviti es which the partnership itself wa engaged 
in, compensa tion for suc h transac ti n mus t b , 
treated merely as a rea rrangement betw een th 
partne rs of their di s trib uti ve s h a r s in th 
partnership incom e. 311 
The Service follows Pratt in holding that th partner-
s hip agreement is controlling as to the m eanin g of 
"partner capacity" services .312 Such se rvi c s n d not 
be recurring or continual.3 13 If the e rvi ces are 11 01 
provided in a partn rship capacity, th n ecti n 707(a) 
applies calling for separa t entity/p ayment treatment. 
Some in the Servi ce have u gges ted th e followin g 
a na lys is in determining partner capacity s rvi s: 
When dealing wi th a fac t si tua tion s uch a. that 
in Pratt, the first step should be to consider 
whe ther the partner is ac ting o th er th an in his 
capacityasapartner.Thiswilld termi newh th r 
subsection (a) or (c) of schon 707 applies. 
As mentioned previous ly, the All proposa l for 
sec tion 707 con is ted only of what i n w, in s ub-
tance, ubsec tion (a ). Under the ALI proposa l, a 
fixed salary paid to a pa rtne r by a p artnership for 
serv ices rend e red other th an in h is capacity as a 
partner would have been treated under the ent ity 
approach. We be lieve that on gress added ub-
sec tion (c) to apply the entity app roac h in ce rtain 
s itua tions not covered by subsection (a), namely, 
when a partner rece ives a guaranteed payment in 
his capacity as a partner. Thus, in order to de ter-
mille whether to apply s ubsection (a) or (c), it i 
first necessa ry to an a lyze wheth r a partner ac t d 
in his capacity as a p artner und er subse li on (a). 
We realize that it will no t alway be ea y to 
decid whether services a r e rend red in a 
partner' capacity as a partner. The approach of 
your proposed ruljng i to look a t a ll f the ur-
rounding facts to determ in e wheth r th pa rtner, 
in substance, is acting other than in the capaci ty 
of a partne r. On th fac ts pr sent d in th ruling, 
we think it clear that the inv stm ent adv i or i 
not acting as a partne r. Were it n t for th inve t-
ment advisor's s mall int eres t in pr fit a nd 
losses, it would not be a partner a t a ll but mer Iy 
a third-party dealing with the pa rtner hip . W 
think it equally clear that the taxpayers in Pra ll 
were acting as p a rt·ne rs a nd no t a third-partie. 
Unfortun ately, however, we can point to no one 
fact in either ca e tha t di ct;! te the r e ult reached. 
We previou ly c ns id e red thi s pr b le m in 
GCM 37193, w, 1-430-75 Ouly 13, 1977), and a l-
311Prnlt , 550 F.2d at 1026. 
12See GeM 37193 (Aug . 29, 1979). Accord, Tech. Adv. Mem. 
8539003 (June 13, 1985) (partnership agreemen t controls). 
313See GeM 37193, SlIprn. 
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thou gh we arrived a t no precise rule for distin-
guishing between s ubsections (a) and (c), we sug-
ges ted as a n analysis that the test is whe ther the 
services in question are being contributed to the 
partnershjp. U they are, ubsection (c) will control. 
On the other hand, if the partner is not contributing 
services but is acting as any other third-party, sub-
section (a) will c ntrol. As we recognized in GCM 
37193, this approach g ives the partners substantial 
freedom in deciding which section will control. The 
purpose underlying section 707, however, was to 
es tab lis h th a t partners could deal with th e ir 
partnerships as third p arties, and presumably 
partners have always had the freedom to decide 
what capital or services should be donated to their 
partnerships. Thus, we are not overly concerned 
with the fa ct tha t par tne rs are afforded som e 
freedom to dec id e the way in which they will deal 
with their partnerships.314 
Fu rthermore, 
I iJn determining whether a transfe r of money 
or property to a partners hip con s titutes a contri-
bution, as distinguished from a sa le, exchange, 
loan o r rental tra nsac tion, the sa me criteria used 
in connection with corporate debt-equity ques-
tions are to be applied .... The regulations s ta te 
that if a transfer of property by a partner to a 
partnersltip results in the receipt by the partner 
of mon ey o r other can ide ration, inc luding a 
promissory obligation fi xed in amount and time 
for payment, the transaction will be treated a a 
sa l or exchange under Code sec tion 707 rather 
than a co ntribution under Code section 721. 
Treas. Reg. section 1.721 -1(a). By analogy these 
criteria should a lso be applied in d etermining 
wh e ther the performClnce of se r vices for a 
par tnership cons titutes a 'sa le or exchan ge' of 
such services or a con tribution . 
In the proposed ruling A rec ives no considera-
tion for his se rvices o ther tha n a sha re of partner-
sh ip profit. Although many fac tors must be 
cons idered in determining whether a particul a r 
transact io n cons titutes a contribution, the fact 
that a transferor of property o r rende rer of ser-
vices receives only a right to sha re in profits 
should genera lly be g iven mo re weight than the 
o the r factors conidered.31s 
l"GCM 38067 (Aug. 29, 1979), considering Rev. Rul. 81-301, 
at pp. 17-19; flccnrrl, GCM 36702 (Apr. 12,1976). 
JlSGC M 37193 Ou ly 13, 1977). See also Tech . Adv. Mem. 
B642003 (June 30, 1986) (" In general, transactions between 
p~r tn e r s and partnerships fa ll into one of three classes of 
transactions for federa l income tax purposes. TIlese three 
ca tegories are: (1) transactions wi th a partner other than in 
his capaci ty as a par tner, (2) guaranteed payments to a 
p~rtner for the use of capital or for se rvices rendered in his 
capacity as a partner, and (3) all other payments to a partner 
in his c, pacity as a partner. Section 707(a) of the Code is 
app li ca ble to the first category of transactions. Section 707(c) 
of the ode is appl icable to the econd category of transac-
lions. Section 702, 703, 704 and 731 of the Code [and com-
mon-law Cllibal soll nonrealization admission) are app li cable 
to the third category of transactions .") 
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I hav e suggested above that a "contribution" /cor-
porate d ebt equity analysis may be too limited . Among 
other things, s uch corporate debt-equity ana lysis turns 
more on risk of payment, which in the p a rtnership 
context speaks more to entrepreneurial risk as to pay-
ment. 316 While some corporate debt-equity precedents 
turn on whether "essential opera ting assets" are trans-
ferred, often this factor seems more of a backs top to 
debt-equity ratio.317 The better approach would be to 
pursu e the thought in some Service rulings on whether 
the services are within the scope of the agreement, 
usual for the particula r business, and perhaps usual 
for that particular partners hip.318 I suspec t th a t this 
a rea will need more rulings before the principles ca n 
b e articulated . 
2. Paymen t sub ject to entrepreneurial risk. As the 
tax sheltered taxpayer' s pre ferred tax pos ture shifted 
from "guaranteed paym ents" for s uch management 
services to "distributive sha re," the Service too fIip -
flop~ed, as recounted above. In Revenue Ruling 81 -
300, 19 the Interna l Revenue Service disagreed with the 
Tax Court's conclusion in Pratt that the payments were 
not section 707(c) "guaranteed payments, " si nce they 
were measured by gross income. The Service reasoned 
that on the Pratt facts, the gross income requirement 
did not come within the sec tion 707(c) tes t that the 
pa y ment be dete rmined without rega rd to th e 
partnership 'S income. "It is the position of the lnt m al 
Revenue Service that in Pratt the m a nagement fees 
were guaranteed payments und er Section 707(c) of the 
Code. On the facts presented, the payments were not 
disguised distributions of partnership net income, but 
were compensation for se rvices p ayable with o ut 
regard to partnership income."320 At the sa me time, in 
Revenue Ruling 81-301,321 the S rvice buttressed Prall's 
section 707(a) analysis by seemingly limiting th e 
predecessor to secti on 707(a)(1)'s nonpartner capaci ty 
transactions to those where the partner's rvices for 
the partnership in question were sub ta nti ally the same 
as services it rendered as an independent contrac to r or 
as an agen t for o thers.n2 Furthermore, the inves tnlent 
advisor was not personally lia ble for partnership losses 
incurred in investments made pursu ant to its se rvices 
o r advice, paid its own ex penses in rendering advice 
(including off ice expenses and personnel expenses), 
a nd could be removed by a majority vote of the other 
partners. 
l l6See also note 2 s upra. 
.117 Aquala ne Shores, In c. v. Commissiol1 er, 269 F.2d 116, 119-20 
(5th Cir. 1959). 
JJ8See GeM 37193 supra. 
3191981-2 C. B. 143. 
l1Q Rev. Rul. 81-301, supra note 310, a t 1981-2 C.B. 144. 
32 11981 -2 C.B. 144. 
J22Rev. Rul. 81-301, sllpra note 310, at 1981-2 C.B. 144. The 
accompanying GCM 38067 (A ug. 29, 1979), reveals that the 
Service could point to "no one fact" tha t distinguished Pratt's 
general partners who were acting in par tner capacity from 
the investment adviser who but for its "small interest in 
profits and losses, . .. wou ld not be a partner at a ll but mere-
lya th ird-pa rt y dealing wi th the partnership." ld. at 17-18. 
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Con gr s w is Iy concl u ded in 1984 tha t Revenue 
Ruling 81-300 was ins u ffi cient to chan ne l p a rtne rs hip 
pay ment to partne r fo r se rvices tha t w o uld no t be 
curr nlly d d uc ti b le, if pa id to th ird pa rti es, in to sec-
tion 70~(c) las ifi cation a nd, acco rding ly, in the Defic it 
Red uctlOn Act o f 1984, e nacted sec ti n 707(a)(2)(A), 
w hich auth riz r gu la tion (as ye t n o t prop osed ) 
tr a ti ~g a transa .tion as a s clio n 707(a)( l ) no npa rtne r 
capaCI ty tran actIo n (and he nc u bject to the "origin -
o f- the-c1aim" te t, b u t n o t to th p ecial accrual rul es 
o f se ti on 707(c» if (1) the re nditi o n o f the se rvices o r 
tran fe r of prop e rty b th p a rme r, a nd (2) a related 
d irec t or indirec t pa rtn rs hip a ll o cation v iewed 
tog th r wi th th d i t r ibu ti n a r " p rope rly " so char-
ac te ri zed .3D o ng r s s ke tched i n n ex clu ive fac-
to rs for "? e termini~g w he th r th partne r is receiving 
the puta tl V a 110 , t lo n and d i t ribu tio n in his capacity 
as a par t n e~,"3N T he fi rs t, and gen · ra lly mos t impor-
ta n t, fa to r IS w h th r I'h p a rl' n r 's a lloca tion-cum-dis-
tribution is s ubject to signifi < nt e n trepre ne ur ia l ris k 
to th rec ip i n l p a rln e r (s to Ihe a m u n t a nd fact o f 
payment.3~S T he s o n d fa to r i t ra n ito ry partner 
s ta tus, w h l h s ugges ts tha t a paym n t cons titutes a fee 
in re tu rn fo r prop rty.326 Sh rt- te rm, g ross income al-
loca ti n w u ld b par ticula rly u p ecl h e re, due to (1) 
the red u c d r i k, (2) th tra n Hory na tu re o f the 
rela tion h ip, an d (3) the pro jmity in time to the p er-
form a nce of the s rvice (th la tte r two elements also 
can tit u te n g li v cri t ria can ide red y Congress).327 
I IStructured discretion ' serves good public policy when rulemaklng by the agency is routine/~ if not commonll" sought by the taxpayer. 
In s umm a ry, t d t rmin th prope r charac-
teriza tion of the pay me n t, a two- tep a n a lysis often is 
necessary. T h fi rs t CJu s ti n i whe the r the e rvices 
w re p e rf rm d or prope r ty, tc., was tra nsferred in 
th e p a rtn r' ca p aci ty as a pa rtne r. If n o t, sec t ion 
707(a )(1 ) w o uld pp ly if th s ' r v ice prov ide r o r proper-
ty tran·f ro r w r th rwise a p a rtne r. On the other 
h a nd , ev n if th s r vic / pro perty we r e 
provided/ t ra n s fer r d in th e se r v ice prov ider / 
trans fe ro r ' capaci ty a a partner, the paym ent ca n ta ke 
on a non partn r haract ri ti c, i . . , ec tio n 707(c) s ta tus 
as a g u a r a nteed payment o r sec ti o n 707(a )( 2)( A ) 
equ iva lent o f a " f ," if the p ayment te rm ma n ifes ted 
u ffici nt n npartn r ch racteristic a to ce rtainty o f 
pay m nt. A to thi In tt r q u estio n , n e w ectio n 
707(a)(2)(A) ft n , if no t always, s hould be d e te nnina-
tive. 
12JSection 707(a)(2)(A), 
mS. Print. No, 169, slipra note 32, at 226. 
J25Jd. at 227. 
1l'S. Rep. No. ]69, supra n te 32, a t 227, 
m Id. 
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IV. A n Ad m ini Irat ive La w P ers pecti ve 
Fr o m t he begi nnin g of mode rn tede r a l ta x 
s ta tu te , 32 th r ti ia ns, includin g, in the la te 1950 
a nd a r!l 1960, Harva rd Law Prof or Brown and 
Su rrey,3 have d ba ted the ad van tages of ge neralized 
tax ta tut s, i . . , ta ndard, ver u d e ta iled or ru l -
o riented tax ta lut . The recent m ajori ty o f s tud nts 
of taxa ti n f llow th e u r rey chool o f a mo re o r less 
gen e ra li zed ta s ta tute imp le m e n ted and a mplified, 
ho w. v r, .th ro ug h u ndi p utnbly d e ta iled Treas u ry reg-
ul a tIo ns, In la rge p a rt due to the g rea ter Oex ib ility in 
a me nding regu la ti n tha n s ta tutes in light o f d ev lop-
ing adminis tra tiv and judic ia l ex p ri e nc under th 
s ta tu te .3J{) P r f r Da vi ag ree tha t Ih best p licy 
u s ually is " to Ie is la te broad fr a m e work s fo r a d -
m in i tra ti v p li cy -m a kin g ."JJI De tail ed reg ulations 
pro m u lg at d by a n ad mi ni s tra ti v e age n cy, h e re 
Treas u ry a n d th 5 rvi ce, incr ase th p rinc ip led is-
c r ti o n o f th ag n y as a d ec is ion m a ke r, accordi ng to 
Professor Da v is 's I ndma rk book OiscreliOl la ry Juslice 
- A Prel iminary I nq ll iry a nd s ubsequ ent adminis tra ti ve 
law scho ia rs hi p 3J2 I b liev s uch "stru c tured d iscre-
32l1'fhe debat had begun as early as the 1920s. Compart 
Hearings on H. R. 245 b fore the Sen. Comm. on Finan , 
67 th Congo 1 t Sess. 5 (1921) (Sta tement of Dr. Adam) (draft-
ing goal of "a rather simple tax law that the average man Ciln 
understand "), wil li H aring on H. R. 6715 before Ihe Sen. 
Comm. on Fina nce, 68th ong.l t Sess. 7,57 (1924) (Statement 
of A. W. Gregg, Sp ial A ' t to Treasury) (" IC]omplica tions 
come primari ly from a complicated policy," including reor-
ganiza ti ons . "In he bill w iJl cover a given case defin itely and 
certainly. Und er the e isting law there are hundreds of cases 
where n body know th erfe t of the transaction upon the 
tax . TIlis law is defin ite enough so that the taxpayers will be 
able to tell th Hect of a giv n transaction . . . . ") Gregory aro e 
from this very statut and the Boa rd of Tax Appea ls took 
Gregg t hi word . The Sec nd Ci rcui t tru mped the boa rd's 
s tatutory liter Ii m wi th the business pu rpos s tandard . 
Jl~Brown , "A n App roach to Subcha pte r C," 3 Tax Revision 
Compendill lll '16] 9, 1619-20 (1 960) (de ta iled tax statu tes lead 
to defi ci n ies and anoma li s a ppearing tha t require ven 
more in tri ca t elaborations of pattern; fundamenta l so urce is 
a ttempt to limina t the nee ssity fo r responsib le admini stra-
tion): urrey," omplex ity and the Interna l Revenue Code: 
The Problem of th Management of Tax Detai l," 34 Law & 
Con temp. Probs. 673, 69 -702,703-07 (deba te between general -
ized and p a rt icular ized tilX s ta tu tes; concl ud es id ea l is 
generahz d ta t ute with detai led regulations). Interestingly, 
the Ta Reform Act of] 69, which was Surrey 's brainchild, 
see Lee, supra note 7 , a t 132 n. 346, rarely took this tack 
(section 385 constitutes a conspicuous e ception) . 
)30£.g., Complexity alld tire Income Tax, sllpra no te 329, t 
348-5 1. But see E. Cohen, "Remarks," 26 Nan Tax f. 311, 311-12 
(1974). For an e cellent, brief discussion of the recent pattern, 
including the "worst of all world ... ex tremely detailed 
sta tutes ... w ith broad gra nt s of regulatory autho rity ... ," 
see Evans, "The Cond ition of the Tax Legis la tive Proce s," 39 
Tax Notes 1581, 1590 (J une 27, ]988). 
3J ISee Dav is, supra note 10, a t 38. 
lJlDavis, Discrt tionary Jllstic/!, A Preliminary Inquiry, at 103 
(LS U Press 1969); set also Ma h aw, Braeall cra tic fll stice, 
Man ag ing Social Disabilit y Claims, a t 103-22 (Yale llniv. Press 
1983). 
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tion " serves good public policy when ru lemaking by 
the agency (as in the form of IRS private letter rulings) 
is routinely, if not commonly, sought by the taxpayer. 
Administrative law scholars be lieve that agencies, 
through str uctured discretion, e.g., issuing regulations 
(rulemaking) setting forth specific factors to be used in 
balancing tes ts implementing the d esired standards 
and policies, can implement s tandards effectively 
while maintaining th e burea ucra t's discretion ary 
judgement in app li ca ti on. They be lieve that such 
detai led rules channeling agency exercise of discretion 
can develop {rom first cons id ering one concrete prob-
lem at a time, announcing the hypo th tica l cases a 
ruling and refraining from generalizin g; then fashion-
ing generalized principles or s tandards from this ex-
perience; and finall y formulating regulations to imple-
ment the sta nd ard in the form of s tructure d 
discretion. 333 
Some commen tators call for legis lat ion on the 
grounds that current case law has preempted sound 
regula tory au thority. 334 A compa rison of Campbell II 
wi th Mark IV highlights the p reemption problem . 
However, having ac ted in 1984 and having largely 
taken the revenue out of the area with the passive 
activity loss rules in 1986, Con gress is not likely to heed 
uch ca ll s . A landm a rk decision deahng with aggregate 
and distortion of character of income policies might 
end the con fusion; an admini strative remedy is more 
likely. Remember the reserved section 707 legislative 
regulations section for disguised se rvices: Do we have 
to wa it fo r the S rvice to a ttack the problem piece-by-
p iece building up to legisla tive regula tions? I have at-
t mpted to show that the Service a lready has had vast 
ruling exp ri ence in common law entry in to a partner-
ship and fair ruling exp rie nce with the "substitution 
fo r ordinary income" if the route of stand ards is chosen 
to resolve the profit share for services issue. Converse-
ly, if a rule-oriented tai nted freestanding intangible 
approach is chosen, then fewer ruHngs are needed. In 
eith r case, the Service could soon issu e draft discus-
s ion proposal cal ling for comments if it w ishes to 
address the issue from a s ubchapter K perspective in 
legis lative section 707 regulations. [f it just wished to 
resolve premature sa les of a profit sh a re in year 1 after 
close of the tax year/or in yea r 2, then simple tax 
ace unting modifica tions to R venue Procedure 93-27 
are in order. 
Appendix: Aggregate vs. Entity 
The be t commen ta ry for purposes of the aggregate-
entity d bate in the contex t of a profits share for ser-
vices are the "Partnership Tax Colloquium" in 47 Tax 
Law Review; the seminal LQ/1e, "Sol Diamond, The Tax 
Cour t Upsets the S [vice Par tne r, " 46 So. Ca l. L. Rev. 
239 (1973) (fi rst in my no tebook on this is ue and 
w hi ch I apprecia ted a lot more after studying the legis-
la ti v history of the partnership tax provis ions of the 
Deficit Red uction Act of ] 984); and others who have 
llJDavis, slipra note 10, at 60. 
ll<L.A . Bar Report, s upra note 5. 
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studied tha t history, particularly Hortens tine & Ford, 
"Receipt of a Partnership Interes t for Services: A Con-
troversy That Will Not Die," 65 Taxes 880 (1987). Fried-
man, "Partnership Securities," 1 Fla . Tax Rev. No. 9 
(1993), electronically reproduced at 93 TNT 226-166 
(Nov. 3, 1993), carefully probes aggregate and entity 
approaches to partnership "securities" received for 
cash and received for serv ices. Cowan, "Receipt of an 
Interest in Partnership Profits in Consideration for Ser-
vices: the Diamond Case," 27 Tax L. Rev. 161 (1972), set 
the terms of the debate among practitioners for the last 
two d ecades. T have war stories about drafting some of 
his suggestions - Lane appears to hav influ nced the 
commitment of the American Law Institute, Federal 
Income Tax Project Subchapter K Proposals xii, 5-7, 
523-32 (1984) to the aggrega te approach (which they 
call the "conduit approach") and s ur ly the la tter 's 
s ta n da rd of how a partner, my " h ypo th e ti ca l 
proprietress," would be taxed "if he ca rried on a 
h ypothetica l separa te business." [d. a t 524. And the All 
Partnership Proposals in turn seem to me to have 
strongly influenced Professor C unningham 's thought. 
For a genera l ch arting of the sea o f aggregate-entity 
authorities, see Fellows, "Partnership Taxa tion : Con-
fusion in Section 702(b)," 32 Tax L.Rev. 67 (1976) . For 
m y thoughts at th time, pleas follow Professor 
Fell ows's cites. [d. a t 68 n. 6, 74 nn. 33 and 34, 75 n. 38, 
86 n . 63, and 89 n . 78. She also roadmaps Wolfman's 
classic "Level for Determining Ch aracter of Partner-
s hip mcome - Entity v. Conduit Principle in Partner-
ship Taxation," 19 N.Y.U. Jl1 st. 287 (1961), which is 
where J s tarted. Professor Fellows' eye was good - the 
level of profit motive in a partne rship theme tha t she 
followed in Lee, "Section 183," slIpra note 15, w as con-
temporaneously convincing as well to the IRS Chief 
Counsel in La unching the initial a ttack again t "abusive 
tax shelters." GCM 36577 (Feb. 26, 1976). And the IRS 
ultimately convinced the courts of the correctness of 
m y conclusion tha t profit mo tive should be d etermined 
a t the partnership level. Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 
F.2d 695, 703-04 (11th Cir. 1984). But by that time, 
having left the partnership area in practice, I had for-
gotten what I had worked out and erroneously thought 
"another time they should have li tened to me." I now 
see the reason fo r entity-level computation of profi t 
motive is that this motive is an essentia l attribute of 
"reporting" that is done at the entity level. Al so, for a 
recent sketch of a broad range of aggregate-entity 
partnership issues, see Schnee, "The Future of Partner-
ship Taxation," 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 517,523-27 (1993)-
The thoughts of some in the Service on aggregate-
entity under the 1954 and hence 1986 code may be seen 
in GCM 35709 (Mar. 6, 1974), cons idering Rev. Ru!. 
75-113 (Basye evidences that p a rtne rships are con-
sidered entities primarily for purpo es of computing 
the income, and hence the tax, w ed by the partn rs. 
Basye teaches that for purposes of calcu lating partner-
ship income, "the partnershjp is regarded as an inde-
pendently recognizable enti.ty apart from its partners. 
Once its income is ascertained and reported, its exist-
ence may be disregarded .. . 410 U.s . at 448. "In our 
opinion, thi s . .. is a tacit assumption that in aU other 
respects, with the excep tion of tha t described beLow, 
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the partnership is considered an aggregate of its 
partners. The on exception is, of course, when a 
partner is dealing with his partnership [i.e., Section 
707]. Such tran saction could not be given effec t if the 
separa te exis tence of the two were not recognized. In 
the instant case, however, we are concerned with a 
transaction between the partners qua partnership and 
an umelated third party rather than a transaction be-
twe n a partner and his partner hip ." See also GCM 
37540 (May 18, 1978) ("Despite the characterization of 
a partner hip inter st as a capital asset under section 
741, we believe that the exception for section 751 assets 
upon the sale or exchange of an interest in a partner-
ship, evidences an intent to look beyond the partner-
ship interes t to th underlyi ng assets when warranted 
in a given si tuation. By tT atiog the stock received in 
exchange for a partner's interest in the partnership 
attributable to ' ection 751 as ets: to the extent those 
assets are not described in section 1231, as not coming 
within section 1223(1), a partner, in accord with con-
gressional intention, is put on almost the same footing 
as an individua l proprietor in a trans fer of his intere t 
in the busine 5."), reconsidering Rev. Rul. 70-239; Priv. 
Let . Ru1. 60057490A (May 17, 1960). Cf. IRS as to elec-
tion out. Priv. Let. RuJ. 92J4011 (Dec. 26, 1991). The 
Supreme Court in Unit ed St.utes v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441, 
448 n.8 (1973) quoted th Solicitor G neral as to the 
aggrega te-entity conflict "it seems odd that we should 
s till be discus ing uch things i.n 1972," and employed 
th e ass ignment of in co m e doctrine that other 
authorities have equated with the aggregate approach. 
For the semi nal placing of the aggregate-entity issue 
in the broader context of the spectrum of business en-
tities, see Eus tice, "Subchapter 5 Corporations and 
Partnerships: A Search for the Pass Through Paradigm 
(Some Preliminary Proposals)," 39 Tax L. Rev. 345, 346-
47 (1984); se also id . at 353-55, 381-89 and 433 Appen-
dix B, for analysis of subchapters K and S difference 
along the aggregate-entity fault line. As I pointed out 
in Lee, "Entity Classification," supra note 79 at 57, 59 
n.8 (1988), Professor Eustice's passthrough models 
were firs t the basis of Tr asury's testimony in 1986 on 
pas through entitie and then incorporated in bits and 
pieces in S. Rep. No . 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 783-86 
(1986) s tting forth the legis lative history of REMICs, 
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sec tions 860A-E. In my article, I elaborated on the 
passthrough and separate entity model based largely 
on the active-passive owner and active-passiv bu i-
ness or investment factors articulated in the 1986 legis-
lative history to the Passive Activity Loss Limitations. 
/d. at 88-95. I also testified on these models to Congr ss 
in th 1987 Master Limited Partnership Hearings. Hear-
ings on Mas ter Limited Partn rships befor th Hou e 
Ways and Means Subcommittee on Se lect Revenue 
Measures, lOath Cong., 1 t Sess. 340-41, 345, 351 (1987) 
("If substantially all of them [the owners] are not in-
volved in the entity's managem nt r perations, no 
functional basis for an aggregat approach exis ts; 
policy thus calls for an entity approach .. . . IT]he 
hallmark of passthrough [treatment] as to uch [invest-
ment] entlties is that the income of th e activity be pas-
sive. Here [PTP's] we are concerned with active in-
come/passive investor."). Professor Rudnick 
accurately describes my aggregate active owner /active 
business passthrough bus iness approach as "in a 
populist vein." Rudnick, "Who Should Pay the Cor-
porate Tax in a Flat Tax World?," 39 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
965, 1158 n.60 (1989). By an incredible coincidenc , 
Professor Snoe reinvented the wheel here, proposing 
exactly the same model ("Under the pr posed mod I, 
if members significantly part icipate in the op rah ns 
of a business, they should b taxed directly. On the 
other hand, taxation of the business as a separa te entity 
is appropriate if the members do not mate rially par-
ticipate in the business as activity either as manager 
or laborers . The model distinguishes betwee n o r-
ganizations engaged in active trades or bu inesses 
from organizations engaged in passive investmen ts"), 
examining the same tax entities, and even jumpciting 
Professor Rudnick at precisely the section ("Misu e of 
Material Participation Standard") she direct d at my 
article and testimony (which she extensively cited), but 
he failed to acknowledge my article or testimony (or 
indeed the 1987 Master Limited Partnership Hearings 
at all) despite their clear relevance and otherwise x-
emplary resea rch of scholarship and hearings. Snoe, 
"Entity Classification under the Internal Revenue 
Code: A Proposal to Replace the R emblanc Mode!," 
15 ]. of Corp'n L. 647, 649 (1990). 
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